Basel III and the Future of Project Finance Funding by Ma, Tianze
Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review 
Volume 6 Issue 1 
2016 
Basel III and the Future of Project Finance Funding 
Tianze Ma 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mbelr 
 Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, Commercial Law Commons, and the International 
Trade Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Tianze Ma, Basel III and the Future of Project Finance Funding, 6 MICH. BUS. & ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 109 
(2016). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mbelr/vol6/iss1/5 
 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Michigan Law School 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review by 
an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please 
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 




I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
II. FROM BASEL I TO BASEL III . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
III. AREAS OF REFORM IN BASEL III . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
A. Higher Quality and Quantity Requirements of Bank
Capital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
B. Maximum Leverage Ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
C. Liquidity Ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
D. Countercyclical Buffer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
E. Changes to Risk Coverage and Weightings . . . . . . . . . . . 116
IV. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NEW LIQUIDITY REQUIREMENTS . 116
A. Liquidity Coverage Ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
B. Net Stable Funding Ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
V. IMPACT OF BASEL III ON FUNDING PROJECT FINANCE
TRANSACTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
A. Increase in Bank Funding Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
B. Shorter Tenors for Project Finance Loans . . . . . . . . . . . 119
C. Less Use of Letters of Credit and Revolving Credit
Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
VI. THE RISE OF ALTERNATIVE FUNDING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
A. The Rise of Project Bonds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
B. The Rise of Institutional Investors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
VII. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
I. INTRODUCTION
Project finance is a non-recourse financing technique that funds invest-
ment projects based upon the projected cash flows of a project, rather than
the general assets or creditworthiness of project sponsors.  It is a crucial
source of funding for various industries that are vital to the modern econ-
omy, such as infrastructure, energy, and telecommunication.  Typically, a
project financing structure involves one or more sponsors who act as in-
vestors and a syndicate of banks that provide loans that fund 70-80% of
the project.  As a result, regulation of banking activities, such as capital
requirements or liquidity coverage ratios, significantly affects banking in-
dustry’s position on project finance.
Since the 2007-2008 financial crisis (the Financial Crisis), the interna-
tional banking community has recognized the weaknesses in the pre-Fi-
* J.D. Candidate, University of Michigan Law School, 2017. B.A., Middlebury
College, 2011.
109
110 Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review [Vol. 6:109
nancial Crisis banking regulatory framework, and responded with a series
of reforms.  The new rules, commonly referred to as Basel III, tightened
banking regulation in a number of areas closely related to the traditional
project finance funding scheme through commercial banks.
This paper seeks to analyze the new requirements in the Basel III
banking regulatory framework and explore their impact on commercial
banks’ project finance portfolio.  The paper begins with a general intro-
duction of the Basel Accords, followed by an analysis of the changes in the
Basel III requirements and their potential impact on project finance, in
particular the effects of the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) and the net
stable funding ratio (NSFR).  The paper ends with a discussion of alterna-
tive sources of project finance funding that emerged as a result of the new
regulatory regime.
II. FROM BASEL I TO BASEL III
One would normally associate the name “Basel” with the Swiss city
known for its postcard scenery and fine-watchmaking industry, but for
bankers around the world, the name is associated with a series of global
banking regulatory protocols conceived and issued by the Basel Commit-
tee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) under the Bank for International Set-
tlement (BIS) located in the city of Basel.
BCBS and the first Basel Accord were born in an era of increasing
international banking activities.  That era, the 1970s, was characterized not
only by floating exchange rates and high inflation, but also by the rapid
growth of international financial markets and of cross-border money
flows. In 1974, the collapse of Bankhaus Herstatt and Franklin National
Bank highlighted the lack of efficient banking supervision of banks’ inter-
national activities, which prompted the G10 central bank Governors to
form the BCBS as a forum for regular cooperation on banking supervisory
matters.1  Its objective was, and continues to be, to enhance understanding
of key supervisory issues and improve the quality of banking supervision
worldwide.2
The first Basel Accord, known as Basel I, was devised in 1988 and in-
troduced a credit risk measurement framework for internationally active
banks.  It set out minimum capital requirements (i.e., the amount of capi-
tal as a percentage of risk-weighted assets) for banks with the goal of mini-
mizing credit risk.3  Bank assets were grouped into different categories
1. Basel I was largely a response to the perceived failings of financial deregulation
throughout the 1980s. See Peter King & Heath Tarbert, Basel III: An Overview, 30(5) Bank-
ing & Fin. Servs. Policy Report 1 (2011).
2. BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENT, Basel Committee on Banking Supervi-
sion, https://www.bis.org/bcbs (last visited Dec. 1, 2016).
3. BCBS, International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards, 8
(Jul. 1988), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs04a.pdf (stating, “[t]here are many different kinds of
risks against which banks’ managements need to guard. For most banks the major risk is
credit risk. . .”).
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depending on their respective credit risk, and weighted accordingly.  These
assets were then referred to as risk-weighted assets. For example, cash car-
ries a risk weight of 0%, residential mortgages 50%, and most corporate
debts are 100% risk-weighted.4  The required minimum capital ratio was
8%, calculated by dividing a bank’s core capital by its risk-weighted asset
value.5
The second Basel Accord, Basel II, was first published in 2004 and
addressed new risks that had arisen in the banking world.  It refined the
Basel I rules, which focused on the definition of capital and risk weighting,
in the context of credit risk. Basel II’s reforms were grouped into three
main areas, known as the three pillars.
Pillar 1, the capital requirements pillar, set out how banks should cal-
culate the minimum capital they are required to hold to cover credit risk,
market risk, and operational risk.  Like the Basel I rules, the minimum
level of banks’ capital was determined with regard to the riskiness of the
assets held by banks, with a minimum capital ratio of no less than 8% of a
bank’s risk-weighted assets.  However, in order to have banks hold more
capital against riskier assets, it establishes new asset classes based on asset
types, and subclasses based on credit risk.6
Pillar 2, the supervisory pillar, set out a supervisory review process in-
tended to enable supervisors to both confirm that banks have adequate
capital resources and compel banks to hold those resources if they do not
already hold them.  It also intended to encourage banks to develop and
use better risk management techniques.7
Pillar 3, the market discipline pillar, encouraged discipline by means of
a set of disclosure requirements for bank capital adequacy based on the
Pillar 1 framework.  The aim was to allow other market participants to
assess key information on a bank’s capital, risk exposures, and risk assess-
ment processes.  By the sharing of information, the disclosure requirement
facilitates assessment and understanding of a bank by other market play-
ers, such as investors, analysts, customers, other banks, and rating agen-
cies, thus leading to good corporate governance.8
While the initial Basel II proposal assumed that project loans were
considerably riskier than corporate loans and therefore would require
large increases in capital reserves, project finance bankers worked collec-
4. Id. at 8-9, 21.
5. Id. at 14.
6. Under Basel II, banks must categorize banking-book exposures into broad classes
of assets with different underlying risk characteristics. The classes of assets are (a) corporate,
(b) sovereign, (c) bank, (d) retail, and (e) equity. BCBS, Part 2: The First Pillar – Minimum
Capital Requirements, BCBS 52 (June 2006), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128b.pdf [hereinaf-
ter Part 2: The First Pillar – Minimum Capital Requirements].
7. See BCBS, Part 3: The Second Pillar – Supervisory Review Process, 1 (June 2006),
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128c.pdf [hereinafter Part 3: The Second Pillar – Supervisory Re-
view Process].
8. See id. at 226.
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tively to develop default and loss statistics to disprove this assumption.9
By showing that the performance of project loans is similar to that of low-
investment-grade corporate loans, the project finance bankers persuaded
the Basel Committee to reduce the proposed capital requirements for pro-
ject loans.10  However, the original impact of Basel II was a reduction in
commercial banks’ risk-adjusted return on project loans to undesirable
levels, and some banks still reduced their project lending, even though the
capital requirements initially proposed were reduced.11
The Financial Crisis revealed a number of weaknesses of the global
regulatory framework.  Elements of Basel II that contributed to the Finan-
cial Crisis include: (1) the regulatory capital regime was too permissive; (2)
the definition of capital was so broad that it eroded the capital quality; (3)
there was excessive on- and off-balance sheet leverage of banks; (4) there
were insufficient liquidity buffers; and (5) the interconnectedness of the
industry exacerbated the rapid spread of any problems.12
The exposure of these weaknesses in the existing regime forced regula-
tors to reform the Basel Accord once again, introducing what has been
known as Basel III in  December 2010. Various revisions and additions
were undertaken in between 2010 and 2014, such as a revised liquidity
framework published in January 2013, revisions in the leverage ratio re-
gime, and an expanded NSFR issued in January 2014.  In this regard, the
Basel Accord should be viewed as an ongoing process, during which the
Financial Stability Board (FSB)13 and the BIS assist the BCBS to make
adjustments to the current regime in response to the changing financial
market.
III. AREAS OF REFORM IN BASEL III
To ensure that banks be more resilient to economic turbulence, Basel
III has made substantial changes to the previous regulatory regime.  The
most important changes from Basel II to Basel III are summarized in this
section.
9. Part 2: The First Pillar – Minimum Capital Requirements, supra note 6 at 53; Benja-
min Esty et al., An Overview of Project Finance and Infrastructure Finance – 2014 Update,
Harvard Business School No. 214-083, 14 (Jan. 2004), http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Pages/item
.aspx?num=47358.
10. Benjamin C. Esty & Aldo Sesia, Basel II: Assessing the Default and Loss Charac-
teristics of Project Finance Loans (A), HARV. BUS. SCHOOL, (2002, as revised Jan. 2004) http:/
/www.hbs.edu/faculty/Pages/item.aspx?num=29463.
11. Id.
12. RUTH WANDHÖFER, TRANSACTION BANKING AND THE IMPACT OF REGULATORY
CHANGE BASEL III AND OTHER CHALLENGES FOR THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 117 (2014). See
also ROD MORRISON, THE PRINCIPLES OF PROJECT FINANCE 96 (Rod Morrison ed., 2012).
13. Established at the 2009 G-20 London Summit, the Financial Stability Board is an
international body that monitors and makes recommendations about the global financial sys-
tem. See FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD, Our History, http://www.fsb.org/about/history.
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A. Higher Quality and Quantity Requirements of Bank Capital
Since the days of Basel I, regulation of capital has been at the core of
the Basel regimes.  According to BCBS, the Financial Crisis showed that
banks held insufficient levels of high quality capital.14  The minimum capi-
tal ratio maintains stability of banking activities by ensuring that banks
retain enough capital to absorb losses in the event of financial turbu-
lence.15  However, the Financial Crisis also revealed the inconsistency in
the definition of capital across jurisdictions and the lack of disclosure that
would have enabled the market to fully assess and compare the capital
quality across jurisdictions.  To deal with these problems, the new defini-
tion of capital focuses more on common equity, the highest quality compo-
nent of a bank’s capital.
Like Basel I and II, Basel III requires a bank’s overall capital ratio to
be 8% at all times.  However, it adds requirements as to the composition
of such capital:
a) 6% must consist of Tier 1 capital, of which 4.5% must be in common eq-
uity, i.e., ordinary shares and retained earnings.  The remaining 1.5% may
be made up of “additional going concern capital,” which has the equity-
like ability to absorb losses.
b) 2% may consist of Tier 2 capital, which may have more debt-like charac-
teristics than Tier 1.  Nonetheless, it must be deeply subordinated and
meet strict criteria as to its loss absorption.  General criteria for inclusion
in Tier 2 Capital include: subordinated to depositors, neither secured nor
covered by a guarantee of the issuer, and a minimum original maturity
period of at least five years.16
Basel III also imposes an additional capital requirement of 2.5% of
risk-weighted assets, known as the “capital conservation buffer.”17  This
buffer is created so that banks have an additional capital cushion to absorb
economic losses in period of high financial turmoil.  After this buffer is
drawn upon, banks are supposed to rebuild it by reducing discretionary
distributions of earnings.  If a bank does not maintain this buffer, it may be
constrained from paying dividends or bonuses.  Therefore no bank is likely
to treat this capital conservation buffer requirement as optional.18
B. Maximum Leverage Ratio
One underlying feature of the Financial Crisis was the build up of ex-
cessive on- and off-balance sheet leverage in the banking system, which
was also a prominent feature in previous crises.19  Leverage is the ratio of
14. BCBS, Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework for More Resilient Banks and
Banking Systems, 1 (Dec. 2010), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf [hereinafter Basel III: A
Global Regulatory Framework].
15. See id; see also WANDHOFER, supra note 12, at 114-15.
16. See Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework, supra note 14, at 14-19, 27-28.
17. Id. at 54-57.
18. MORRISON, supra note 12, at 96.
19. Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework, supra note 14, at 4.
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debt borrowed relative to the amount of the owner’s equity interest.  As
the market forced the banking sector to reduce its leverage (e.g., by the
sale of debt assets), downward pressure on asset prices was amplified,
which further exacerbated the feedback loop between losses, declines in
bank capital, and the contraction in credit availability.20
BCBS therefore introduced a new gross leverage ratio requirement
that will become mandatory in 2018.  According to Basel III, a bank’s cap-
ital has to be equal to at least 3% of its total un-weighted assets, meaning
that the maximum leverage ratio for a bank will be 33.3 times its capital.
Significantly, off-balance sheet items and net derivative exposures are to
be included in the test.21  The objectives are two-fold.  First, by con-
straining leverage, Basel III helps to mitigate the risk of the systemic
deleveraging processes, which can damage the financial system.  Second,
by supplementing the risk-based measure with a simply, transparent, inde-
pendent measure of risk, it safeguards against model risk and measure-
ment error.22
The new leverage ratio requirement remains controversial for several
reasons.  The non-risk-adjusted measure could incentivize banks to focus
on lending with higher risks, and correspondingly higher returns, to in-
crease returns on equity.  Pressure also arises on banks to sell low margin
assets (e.g., mortgages), which could drive down prices on these assets.23
Additionally, the market and the rating agencies may require banks, to
maintain a lower leverage ratio than required by the regulator.24  None-
theless, the new requirement is expected to act as a backstop measure to
reduce the risk of excessive leverage build-up in the institution.
C. Liquidity Ratio
As the Financial Crisis has shown, liquidity can be as important a varia-
ble as bank capitalization in valuing bank soundness and its ability to with-
stand economic downturns.  The banking system’s inability to repay its
liabilities with sufficiently liquid assets is considered to be a main cause of
the Financial Crisis.25  Despite adequate capital levels, many banks during
the early “liquidity phase” of the Financial Crisis still experienced difficul-
ties due to the lack of prudent liquidity management.  The rapid reversal
in market conditions illustrated how quickly liquidity could evaporate and
leave a bank in a plight of illiquidity for an extended period.
20. Id.
21. See id. at 61-64.
22. Id. at 4.
23. KPMG, Basel III: Issues and Implications, 10 (2011), http://www.kpmg.com/global/
en/issuesandinsights/articlespublications/documents/basell-iii-issues-implications.pdf.
24. Id.
25. See STEFANO GATTI, PROJECT FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE: DESIGNING,
STRUCTURING AND FINANCING PRIVATE AND PUBLIC PROJECTS 322 (Academic Press 2d ed.
2012).
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To strengthen Basel III’s liquidity framework, BCBS introduced two
new minimum standards for funding liquidity: the LCR and the NSFR.
LCR is the ratio of high-quality liquid assets (HQLA) to the expected cash
outflows in the following 30 days estimated on the basis of a stressed sce-
nario.  The LCR is intended to promote short-term resilience to potential
liquidity disruptions, and to help ensure that global banks have sufficient
high-quality liquid assets in stressed funding scenarios.26  NSFR is the ra-
tio of stable sources of funding available to the bank, also called available
stable funding (ASF), to the corresponding optimal value of the stable
funding sources, depending on the structure and the quality of bank as-
sets.27  ASF must at all times be at least 100% of required stable funding
(RSF).28  It is designed to encourage and incentivize banks to use stable
sources to fund their activities to reduce dependency on short-term whole-
sale funding.
D. Countercyclical Buffer
BCBS pointed out that “losses incurred in the banking sector can be
extremely large when a downturn is preceded by a period of excess credit
growth.”29  These losses can destabilize the banking sector and spark a
vicious circle, whereby problems in the financial system can contribute to a
downturn in the real economy, which then feeds back into the banking
sector.  These interactions highlight the particular importance of addi-
tional capital defenses in periods where systemic risks of stress are grow-
ing markedly.
To ensure that banking sector capital requirements take into account
the macro-financial environment in which banks operate, BCBS intro-
duced in Basel III a countercyclical buffer, in addition to the capital con-
servation buffer.  Where there is excess growth of credit, the national
authority has the option to impose an additional 2.5% buffer of the risk-
weighted assets.30  This means that the minimum capital requirement
could in theory be as high as 13% (comprised of 8% basic capital require-
ment, 2.5% capital conservation buffer, and 2.5% countercyclical buffer).
However, the focus on excess aggregate credit growth means that jurisdic-
tions are likely to only need to deploy the buffer on an infrequent basis.
26. BCBS, Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and Liquidity Risk Monitoring
Tools, 4 (Jan. 2013), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs238.pdf.
27. The amount of ASF is measured based on the broad characteristics of the relative
stability of an institution’s funding sources, including the contractual maturity of its liabilities
and the differences in the propensity of different types of funding providers to withdraw their
funding. See BCBS, Basel III: The Net Stable Funding Ratio, 3 (Oct. 2014), http://www.bis
.org/bcbs/publ/d295.pdf.
28. Id. at 2.
29. BCBS, Strengthening the Resilience of the Banking Sector, 41 (Apr. 2010), http://
www.bis.org/publ/bcbs164.pdf [hereinafter Strengthening the Banking Sector].
30. Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework, supra note 14, at 55; see also MORRI-
SON, supra note 12, at 98.
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E. Changes to Risk Coverage and Weightings
Since a bank’s risk-weighted assets are calculated by multiplying the
asset values by their corresponding weighting factors, the weighting factor
is of vital importance in the calculation of the bank’s capital ratio.  BCBS
recognized that the failure of Basel II regime to capture on- and off-bal-
ance sheet risks, as well as derivative related exposures, was a key destabi-
lizing factor during the Financial Crisis.  In response to these
shortcomings, Basel III put in place a series of additional capital charges
for different risks, primarily exposure to financial institutions and
counterparty risk on derivative exposures.  These capital charges increased
the relative amount of capital that banks have to allocate to their trading
book.31
IV. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NEW LIQUIDITY REQUIREMENTS
Banks face a dilemma when their corporate customers seek long-term
loans that will be difficult to sell or use as collateral, such as project fi-
nance loans.  On the one hand, a bank could fund such loans using short-
term financing sources.  These funding sources, although lower in cost,
may dry up in times of economic stress, leaving the bank with a severe
liquidity problem.32  On the other hand, if the bank secures longer-term
sources of financing at a higher cost to fund such loans, it erodes the
bank’s profitability.33
Many banks opted for the former short-term approach prior to the Fi-
nancial Crisis, but consequences were ultimately disastrous.  When short-
term financing sources effectively shut down during the early stages of the
Financial Crisis, even some adequately capitalized banks found themselves
in dire straits because of liquidity concerns.34  BCBS noted that “[d]uring
the early liquidity phase of the financial crisis starting in 2007, many banks
– despite meeting the existing capital requirements – experienced difficul-
ties because they did not prudently manage their liquidity.”35
To promote prudent liquidity management, the Basel III accord pro-
poses two standards for liquidity: the minimum ratio requirements of LCR
and of NSFR.  These liquidity standards are arguably the most significant
addition to the Basel III framework and are likely to have the most far-
reaching impact on global project finance industry.
A. Liquidity Coverage Ratio
As noted above, the LCR requires banks to hold sufficient HQLA in
order to cover their total net cash outflows over a 30-day period.  In es-
31. MORRISON, supra note 12, at 96-97.
32. Christian M. McNamara & Andrew Metrick, Basel III – Shadow Banking and Pro-
ject Finance (Case Study 2014-1G-V1), Yale Program on Fin. Stability, 2 (2014).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Strengthening the Banking Sector, supra note 29, at 1.
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sence, banks have to behave as if they were constantly in a 30-day Finan-
cial Crisis and need to hold a minimum amount of assets that can be
converted easily into cash in private markets to survive the stress
scenario.36
HQLA are defined as assets with certain safety characteristics that al-
low them to be sold easily in the market with limited losses, so that the
bank can fund its cash outflows.37  HQLA includes cash, central bank
reserves, and government bonds.38 The expected net outflow is simply the
total expected cash outflow, such as withdrawals of retail deposits and
drawdowns by borrowers on committed loan facilities, minus total ex-
pected inflow.39
The LCR requirement treats undrawn facilities such as revolving loans
and liquidity facilities differently.  An undrawn revolving loan requires
10% liquidity cover if made to a non-financial corporate borrower, but
100% cover if made to a special purpose vehicle (SPV), including the
SPVs used in most project financings.40  Banks will also have to have
HQLA equal to a certain percentage (as determined by national regula-
tors) of the amount of any undrawn letters of credit (LC).  Thus, it is fore-
seeable that LC and revolving credit facilities (RCF) will make it more
difficult for banks to meet their required LCR’s.41
While it may be theoretically possible for a bank to reduce the impact
of risk from undrawn facilities by obtaining an indemnity from another
bank, any indemnity will have a negative impact on the LCR of such in-
demnifying bank because it reduces the indemnifying bank’s HQLA and
therefore makes receipt of those indemnities costly.  Therefore, the issuing
bank is unlikely to benefit from any indemnity commitment from other
banks as a liquid asset for purposes of calculating the LCR.  This will al-
most certainly exacerbate the unfavorable position of LCs and RCFs of
the bank.42
B. Net Stable Funding Ratio
The NSFR is the second liquidity standard introduced by Basel III, and
its purpose is “to reduce funding risk over a longer time horizon by requir-
ing banks to fund their activities with sufficiently stable sources of fund-
ing.”43  Specifically, the NSFR is intended “to promote more medium and
36. Etienne Gelencser & James Campbell, Basel III Implementation and the Rise of
Japanese Lenders, Project Finance Magazine (2014).
37. WANDHOFER, supra note 12, at 123.
38. See MORRISON, supra note 12, at 97.
39. WANDHOFER, supra note 12, at 124.
40. MORRISON, supra note 12, at 98.
41. See WATSON, FARLEY & WILLIAMS, Basel III: Potential Effects on Project Finance,
2 (2012), http://www.wfw.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/WFW-Basel-III-ProjectFinance-
Feb2012.pdf.
42. Id. at 2.
43. Strengthening the Banking Sector, supra note 29, at 1-2.
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long-term funding of the assets and activities of banking organizations” to
prevent the reoccurrence of a balance sheet mismatch that created signifi-
cant problems from 2007 to 2009 when short-term funding was used to
back long-term assets (such as project finance loans).44
To achieve this objective the NSFR evaluates a bank’s available
amount of stable funding (capital and liabilities expected to be reliable
over a one-year timeframe) relative to its required amount of stable fund-
ing (based on the liquidity characteristics and residual maturities of the
bank’s assets and off-balance sheet exposures).  As discussed above, the
NSFR mandates that the ratio of ASF to RSF be at least 100% on an
ongoing basis.45
In essence, the NSFR mandate means that the less liquid and longer-
term a bank’s assets and exposures, the more stable funding it will need to
have available to it.46  The result is that banks will have to secure longer-
term, higher cost sources of funding for long-term, illiquid assets, creating
an incentive for banks to avoid such assets overall.
While the NSFR will not come into force until 2018, market pressure
among peers is already causing banks to adjust their funding profile to
meet basic NSFR requirements ahead of schedule and often at significant
cost to banking business.47  Depending on the nature of the specific loan,
project finance assets would typically be allocated to RSF categories with
an RSF factor ranging from 65% to 100%.  This means that banks would
be required by the NSFR to maintain a correspondingly large amount of
ASF for a long period of time.48  As a result, many players in the project
finance market have already announced an intention to withdraw due to
increased costs. Those who continue to lend in the sector do so at reduced
tenors.49  In addition, they seek to ensure that loan facilities are transfera-
ble without borrower consent, and that transactions are structured to take
into account liquidity requirements.50
V. IMPACT OF BASEL III ON FUNDING PROJECT
FINANCE TRANSACTIONS
Commercial banks were the major source of funding for international
projects prior to the Financial Crisis.  They were willing to make project
finance loans with long-maturity, covering both the project’s construction
and operation.  Project bonds, although a meaningful funding source since
44. BCBS, Basel III: The International Framework for Liquidity Risk Measurement,
Standards and Monitoring, 31 (Dec. 2010), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs188.pdf.
45. McNamara & Metrick, supra note 32, at 3.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 6-7.
48. Id. at 7.
49. SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, Basel III Framework: Net Stable Funding Ratio
(Proposed Standards), 3 (2014), http://www.shearman.com/~/media/Files/NewsInsights/Publi-
cations/2014/12/Basel-III-Framework-The-Net-Stable-Funding-Ratio-FIA-120514.pdf.
50. Id.
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the 1990s, were never the dominant funding source, as capital markets and
institutional investors were reluctant to accept construction phase risk.51
Even though Basel III will not be fully integrated until 2018, the
changes in banking regulation and supervision it introduced are likely to
have substantial impact on the outlook for project financing.
A. Increase in Bank Funding Costs
Because of the enhanced capital requirements and tougher definition
of capital, banks will have to bear higher costs when funding project fi-
nance loans.  Various sources estimate that the implementation of Basel
III could add between around 60 bps and 110 bps to a bank’s funding
costs, as compared with Basel II.52  This estimation excludes the proposed
global systemically important banks (G-SIB) requirements, which have in-
creased minimum ratio for common equity for global systemically impor-
tant banks.  Since G-SIB institutions carry out a major portion of global
project finance transactions, it is expected that the actual impact on bank
funding cost will be even higher than the above estimate.53  Empirical data
suggests that pricing remains elevated relative to pre-Financial Crisis
levels, and the number of lenders able to lend project loans for longer than
10 years has also become smaller.54
B. Shorter Tenors for Project Finance Loans
Largely as a consequence of the NSFR, banks are increasingly unwill-
ing to finance project finance with long-maturity loans.  Currently, the
marketplace for tenors greater than seven to ten years grows smaller, es-
pecially for larger loans above £100 million.55  Appetite for loan tenors of
more than 15 years is minimal.56
To adapt to the new Basel regime, banks will seek to manage their
commitment to very long-term exposures in various ways, and project debt
structures may evolve as a result.  For example, commercial banks may
move towards shorter-term mini-perm facilities with bullet or balloon final
repayments, so that the bank’s risk is essentially limited to the construc-
tion phase.57  There has also been “an increased move towards ‘semi-
perm’ structures, under which the borrower is given incentives to refi-
nance, after several years, through the use of ‘cash sweep’ mechanisms and
51. JOHN M. NIEHUSS, INTERNATIONAL PROJECT FINANCE IN A NUTSHELL, 208 (West,
2010).
52. Philipp Harle et al., Basel III and European Banking: Its Impact, How Banks Might
Respond, and the Challenges of Implementation, McKinsey & Company (2011), 9.
53. WATSON, FARLEY & WILLIAMS, supra note 41 at 1.
54. John F. Greenwood, Innovative Solutions in Infrastructure Financing, Citi Project
& Infrastructure Finance, (2014).
55. MORRISON, supra note 12, at 100.
56. Gelencser & Campbell, supra note 36.
57. NIEHUSS, supra note 51, at 208. See also WATSON, FARLEY & WILLIAMS, supra
note 41, at 2.
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increases in margin towards the end of a mini-perm.”58  Alternatively,
banks could persuade project sponsors to accept refinancing risk by struc-
turing loans that mature at seven to ten years, depending on the project.59
Sponsors will then have to play a more active role in the early stage of the
project through increased equity contributions and construction comple-
tion guarantees.60
C. Less Use of Letters of Credit and Revolving Credit Facilities
Working capital facilities in the project context will likely require 100%
short-term liquidity cover because project financing is usually made to an
SPV.  This makes financing RCF relatively expensive for banks.  However,
these types of facilities are often a smaller proportion of a project’s overall
debt, and reduced availability and increased costs of RCFs may not be a
critical issue.
More important may be the impact on LCs, demand for which is signif-
icant in the projects market.  Basel III allows national regulators to specify
the level of LCR cover they will require for letters of credit, and many
have yet to specify what level they will demand.61 But even liquidity cov-
erage requirements of 25% could make it difficult for banks to provide
these products economically.62  It is possible that banks will tie a provision
of a LC facility to receipt concessions in other areas from sponsors.  Given
the crucial role of LCs in project finance, however, they are not likely to
disappear from the project finance market.63
VI. THE RISE OF ALTERNATIVE FUNDING
With the introduction of Basel III regulatory reforms, the landscape of
project financing is changing.  As traditional lenders in the banking indus-
try face more stringent requirements, projects worldwide are increasingly
turning to capital markets to finance the continued demand for growth.
This section analyzes such impact from two interlinked perspectives – the
rise of project bonds and institutional investors – with a focus on infra-
structure financing.
A. The Rise of Project Bonds
The use of capital markets in project financing is not new.  When there
is shortage of public money, governments have been successful in using
public-private partnerships (PPPs) to help finance infrastructure projects,
as the private sector can be more efficient, have more expertise, and have
58. MORRISON, supra note 12, at 100.
59. Id.
60. NIEHUSS, supra note 51, at 209.
61. MORRISON, supra note 12, at 100.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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greater access to financial resources and markets.64  Traditionally, the ma-
jor source of financial market funding for infrastructure projects has been
the commercial banks with a lesser contribution from project bond issued
in the capital market.
However, the situation is different after the Basel III reforms.  Because
banks’ balance sheets are constrained by the capital requirements and li-
quidity ratios described above, they are no longer able to provide substan-
tial amounts of long-term project finance lending.65  This is especially
significant as the shortfall in investment for essential infrastructure
projects around the world is rapidly accumulating – the World Economic
Forum (WEF) currently estimates the shortfall to exceed US $1 trillion
annually.66  This creates a pressing need for new funding sources and led
to growing interests in the use of project bonds to attract investors.  Highly
rated bonds are more liquid than project finance loans and are, by nature,
a long-term commitment which matches institutional investors’ long-term
liabilities and also PPP contract maturities, and thus entail less refinancing
risk.
The development of project bonds in Europe shows how they can play
a more significant role in financing the infrastructure project market.  Four
aspects have been identified as contributing factors to the evolvement of
this bond market.  First, in Europe, there are clients looking for more
competitive pricing to finance projects.  Second, institutional investors,
such as pension funds, constantly seek to diversify their portfolios, and
infrastructure projects in principle can meet their requirements.  Third, the
new regulatory framework limits the traditional bank lending, making
them unable to meet the needs of the European infrastructure project
market.  Fourth, and finally, several supportive instruments for bond fund-
ing developed, such as the Europe 2020 Project Bond Initiative (PBI),
which, through credit support, will enhance a project bond’s credit rating
to levels acceptable to investors.67
The Europe 2020 PBI, launched as a pilot in 2012, exemplifies a bond-
financing model that could be used advantageously for project finance in
the aftermath of Basel III.  Led by the European Commission and the
European Investment Bank (EIB), this initiative is aimed at helping the
European infrastructure projects to access the capital market by creating
favorable conditions to attract institutional investors in the private sec-
64. WHITE & CASE, PROJECT BONDS: THEIR GROWING ROLE IN INFRASTRUCTURE
FINANCE, 1, (2015), http://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/project-bonds-their-grow-
ing-role-global-infrastructure-finance.
65. See Emanuele Rossi & Rok Stepic, INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT FINANCE AND PRO-
JECT BONDS IN EUROPE, 53, (2015).
66. WHITE & CASE, supra note 64, at 1.
67. Id. at 56.
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tor.68  Its roots lie in the European Union’s 2020 objective to create a
mechanism to help fund a _2 trillion investment in the transport, energy
and information and communication technology sectors.  The EIB has set
aside _230 million to deploy in up to ten projects by the end of 2016.69
The PBI proposes to have EIB provide senior bond investors an addi-
tional safety net via injection of subordinated debt to lift the credit quality
of the project bonds, through a process called Project Bond Credit En-
hancement (PBCE).  During the transaction, the PBCE assumes some of
the risk of the given debt facility in one of two possible forms.  It will
either provide credit support during the construction phase (the unfunded
model) or lend direct to projects on a subordinated basis (the funded
model) with respect to the bondholders.70  The unfunded PBCE model is
a contingent credit line for an already fully financed project, used only in
case of cost overrun during construction or if the income is insufficient to
meet interest obligations.  Under the funded PBCE model, EIB provides
for a funded subordinated debt that gives priority to project bonds in the
event of liquidation.  The EIB selects and appraises the projects, structures
the financial model, and monitors the projects thereafter.71  The basic
logic of the PBI is that infrastructure deals often fail for lack of funds due
to government budget constraints, and that PBCE could combine govern-
mental grants with project bonds in a tightening bank loan market to en-
able more projects to be financed.72
The pilot phase of PBI 2020 started in November 2012 and is planned
to finish at the end of 2016.  Nine infrastructure projects have been ap-
proved for refinancing through this facility.  So far, five projects have been
signed with the PBCE instrument and are currently in advanced stages.  A
number of positive findings can be drawn from these transactions.  First,
project bonds can match long-term liabilities with long-term assets and in-
crease yields for the investor.73  Second, the bonds issued at non-invest-
ment grade generally rise to investment grade with the support of the
credit enhancement facility, drawing increased interest from investors.74
Third, the PBCE instrument absorbs a big part of the construction risk.75
Fourth, the PBI led to the increased use of various innovative features in
project bond financing, such as deferred drawdown profile, forward
purchase agreements, and tailored amortization plans.76  More signifi-
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cantly, the EIB reports that in 2013 bond financing accounted for 22 per-
cent of all project debt financing in the EU-28 against a 4 percent average
in the 2000-12 period.77
With these promising findings, it is quite likely that project sponsors
will seek to increase the proportion of project debt offered in bond form,
provided the bonds can achieve the required credit rating.  However, there
are a number of challenges.  First, bondholders have to be persuaded to
accept construction risk in the early phases of a project.78  Given the suc-
cess of the PBI model, where a credit facility absorbs some of the risk, this
may not be an insurmountable problem.  As long as sponsors have suffi-
cient expertise and experience, the issue of construction risk can be miti-
gated to acceptable levels.79  Second, bondholder voting is a cumbersome
way of making key creditor decisions often required in project financings
on issues such as waivers and changes in project documents.  It is yet to be
seen what market standard will emerge to address this issue.  Perhaps a
“bondholders’ agent” concept will evolve or some efficient form of bond-
holder voting system will be made possible.80
B. The Rise of Institutional Investors
The last few years have seen a significant increase in institutional debt
finance, such as non-bank institutions acting as lenders for project financ-
ing.  Also known as shadow banking, institutional debt finance consists of
a variety of participants, including pension funds, insurers, sovereign
wealth funds, and export credit agencies, alongside finance companies, pri-
vate investment funds, business development corporations, asset manag-
ers, hedge funds, and sponsored intermediaries such as money-market
funds.81  Because such institutions are not subject to the Basel accords,
they do not face the same regulatory standards as the banks that have
historically dominated the project finance market.82
The significant increase in the role of institutional investors is partly as
a result of the sharp contraction in bank project finance after the Financial
Crisis, and partly due to non-bank lenders’ search for low-risk, high-yield
assets.  Large life-insurance companies and pension funds are already
77. Id. Even without the comfort of credit enhancement, project bonds are becoming
appealing to investors. For example, an issue of an index-linked, privately placed bond of 41-
year duration without credit enhancement was used to finance a student housing project for
the University of Hertfordshire. See WHITE & CASE, supra note 64 at 7.
78. Michael Wilkins, Out of the Shadows: The Rise of Alternative Financing in Infra-
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81. Wilkins, supra note 78, at 3.
82. New investors to the sector such as BlackRock have entered the marketplace,
while experience participants such as MetLife, Allianz and Macquarie, have set ambitious
fundraising targets in the future. See Wilkins, supra note 78, at 2.
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making direct project finance loans to projects.83  In 2013, up to $25 billion
of project finance debt may come from the shadow banking sector.84
While potentially accounting for only about 12.5% of the total size of the
project finance market, this is a source of project finance funding that
emerged from almost nothing in the past several years.85
Pension fund funding usually involves longer maturities than funding
raised from commercial banks, and, thus, is better suited to the nature of
project finance debt.  Traditionally, however, pension funds looked for
higher return than the bank project finance market required.  However,
following the implementation of Basel III, pension funds may find them-
selves able to compete on pricing.86  As the example in the Europe 2020
PBI has shown, if project bonds can achieve a sufficiently high rating, pen-
sion funds will be a major source of funding.
Typically, pension funds look for inflation-linked returns due to their
risk-averse nature.  If inflation linking can be introduced into a project’s
revenue stream, a financing or equity structure could be devised to ensure
that the pension funds’ return reflects such inflation linking.87  Availabil-
ity-based88 private finance initiative schemes, for example, often combine
stable fixed-rate and inflation-linked cash flows from government, rela-
tively low credit risk, with high recovery rates in case of default.89  These
features seem to complement the long-term liability needs of insurance
companies and pension funds.
Infrastructure debt funds may also help to target pension fund invest-
ment, due to the portfolio effect in relation to risk and enhancing stable
returns.  Such funds may prove to be a useful conduit for institutions to
invest in project finance debt, while spreading the risk across a portfolio of
assets.90
Although the institutional investors have proven to be an increasingly
important source of finance for infrastructure projects worldwide, there
are uncertainties and limitations impeding its growth.
83. E. R. YESCOMBE, PRINCIPLES OF PROJECT FINANCE, Academic Press/Elsevier Sci-
ence 485 (2nd Ed. 2014).
84. Wilkins, supra note 78, at 2.
85. Id.
86. WATSON, FARLEY & WILLIAMS, supra note 41, at 3.
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88. “Availability”-based projects entitle a private entity to receive regular payments
from a public sector client to the extent that the project asset is available for use in accor-
dance with contractually agreed service levels. See NEW ZEALAND SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE
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89. Wilkins, supra note 78, at 4.
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wind projects. See WATSON, FARLEY & WILLIAMS, supra note 41, at 3.
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A major obstacle preventing institutional investors from fully embrac-
ing the project finance market is the perceived heightened level of risk,
compared to other asset classes such as high grade, highly rated sovereign
bonds.91  Institutional investors are wary of being caught in a repeat of the
asset bubble witnessed prior to the Financial Crisis.  Consequently, inves-
tors have shifted away from the private-equity approach, where fund man-
agers would make equity investments on behalf of their clients, aiming to
generate returns within a short timeframe.92  Now, investors are increas-
ingly focused on low risk, low volatility debt-type investments that gener-
ate a more predictable cash yield over a longer timeframe, are more liquid,
and benefit from greater security post-default.93
Another obstacle comes from the investors’ lack of expert teams to
evaluate and monitor such projects.94  For example, the offshore wind
farms that are being constructed in Western Europe are large-scale, diffi-
cult projects that utilize new technology and have little proven track re-
cord of yield.95  Current sources of bank funding are unlikely to be
sufficient to fund these ambitious investments, providing excellent oppor-
tunities for institutional investors.  However, the relative lack of trans-
parency and lack of information associated with these investments led
some industry observers to worry about the potential for the buildup of
systemic risk.96  If a critical mass of institutional investment can be
reached, then reluctance to establish expert evaluation teams may be over-
come, just like hedge funds and insurers entering the infrastructure debt
market have done through external hiring.97
Yet another limit on possible demand from institutional investors is
that there is no market in which loans to project companies can be
traded.98  Put differently, they are illiquid.  Even though bonds are traded
publicly, in practice the market for a particular bond issue may not be very
liquid at the time the investor wishes to sell.  This means that, as with
equity investment, institutional lenders will only want to keep a very lim-
ited proportion of their assets (probably less than 5%) in project-finance
loans.99
Moreover, sector-wise, institutional lenders tend to prefer the most
typical projects, which leads them to favor lending to sectors with less
risky projects.  In addition, as interest rates rise following economic recov-
91. Wilkins, supra note 78, at 4.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 4-5.
94. Id. at 5. See also WATSON, FARLEY & WILLIAMS, supra note 41, at 3; Rossi &
Stepic, supra note 65, at 77.
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ery, it is possible that institutional lenders will move away from the com-
plexities of project finance to the relatively simplicity of other debt
markets such as corporate bonds.100
Finally, all types of institutional investors traditionally have fewer staff
with experience in assessing project finance risk than commercial banks
and less access to the reliable information needed to evaluate the project
creditworthiness.101
VII. CONCLUSION
Basel III has certainly begun to change the ways in which project fi-
nance deals are structured.  Because the new regulatory framework re-
quires banks to hold significantly more liquid assets and reduce their
reliance on short-term funding, their lending ability is adversely affected.
Higher costs will lead to more selective loan portfolios, and will probably
drive some players out of the project finance market entirely.  Those who
remain in the market will lend for shorter maturities and may concentrate
on arranging loans intended for onward sale to the institutional market,
such as pension funds or infrastructure debt funds.
At the same time, project bonds have emerged as a potential substitute
for bank loans to finance long-term projects.  Project bonds are not a new
phenomenon, but their advantages over traditional bank loans became
more salient after the Financial Crisis.  With minimum refinancing risk,
competitive pricing, and improved credit ratings thanks to the help of gov-
ernment support programs such as the European PBI, it can be foreseen
that institutional investors will gradually increase their appetite for project
bonds, making them a major instrument for funding long-term projects.
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